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Abstract. This paper presents some ideas on defining and implement-
ing a new Cyber-security risk metric for measuring the readiness of or-
ganisations, in terms of the availability of their resources, in dealing with
new attack incidents launched against their infrastructures whilst recov-
ering from ongoing incidents. Our new metric, the Mean Blind Spot, is
defined as the average interval between the recovery time of an exist-
ing incident and the occurrence time of a new incident. It is therefore
designed to capture those time intervals where the organisation is most
vulnerable due to possible lack of available resources. We present an ap-
proach for implementing our new metric using open data on security
incidents available from the VERIS community dataset.
1 Introduction
In the context of computing and Cyber systems, measuring risk means
choosing an aspect of vulnerability that may exist in a system to investi-
gate, such as its resistance to threats or its exposure to attack incidents.
The unit by which risk is measured is usually called the risk metric. For
example, to measure the frequency at which security attacks occur in
some system, one may adopt a risk metric that represents the mean time
across these occurrences. Using metrics is a good method for both the
quantification of IT risks and reflection of business needs [10]. They are
used as objective grounds when an organisation needs to make a decision
on its strategy or resource distribution in relation to its IT infrastructure.
Cyber-security risk metrics provide an insight for organisations into the
resilience of their IT infrastructure against attacks carried out from over
the Internet. As a result, they also give an indication of the cost that
may be incurred from the aftermath recovery of such attacks and the
cost needed in the future to defend against them. In literature, there
have been several efforts that attempt to define and collect such Cyber
security-related metrics, examples of which include [4, 11, 7]. And despite
recent surveys (e.g. [12]) that question the validity and usefulness of
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quantified security, we agree more with the view by [3] that past data
are still relevant to new security incidents and that despite the fact that
the road ahead may bend with human whim and technological advance,
. . . it does not appear to bend too sharply too often. Therefore having
some idea of the quantitative aspects of security is better than none.
We introduce in this paper a new Cyber-security metric, which we term
the Mean Blind Spot metric. The new metric is based on the concept
of a blind spot, which represents the time interval between the moment
of occurrence of a new security incident and the moment at which an
existing incident has been fully recovered. As such, a blind spot reflects
the notion of readiness of an organisation or its IT security team to
deal with new security incidents as they occur while dealing with the
recovery from existing ones. Such readiness assumes that the deployment
of resources to the recovery of incidents can only contribute positively
to that recovery. Although our new metric does not identify the cause of
a problem nor suggest a solution for the cause, it can work as objective
evidence when an IT manager argues for more organisational support or
resources to secure their infrastructure. We define an implementation of
this metric in an open-source community dataset.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next Section 2,
we review related work including the collection of Cyber-security and
network security risk metrics defined in [4, 11, 7]. In Section 3, we give
a quick background on a couple of closely related Cyber-security met-
rics and demonstrate their definitions with a simple running example. In
Section 4, we introduce our new metric, the Blind Spot, and discuss its
rationale and definition, including some variations that represent higher-
level views of the problem of blind spots. In Section 5, we present our
implementation using the VERIS dataset. Finally, in Section 6, we con-
clude the paper and give directions for future work.
2 Related Work
As the dependence on ICTs of an organisation increases, it is important
that information security is integrated into business strategies. Many
studies [5, 6, 9] suggest that senior management should discuss IT agen-
das and issues as business matters. However, top decision-makers are
not familiar with IT terms but with business language. If information
security issues are not explained in business terms, it may be hard to
gain support from senior managers. Generally, there needs to be two
things in place to aid the understanding of senior managers. The first is
the quantification of IT issues and responsive measures. When security
risks and countermeasures are quantified, it becomes much easier to cal-
culate business impact resulting from IT issues. The second relates IT
issues to business goals and objectives, where IT agendas reflect needs
of businesses [5].
Many attempts have been made to suggest standardised Cyber-security
metrics for organisations. Each study has a different approach. As an
international body of the UN, the Telecommunication Standardisation
sector of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) published
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Cyber-security indicators of risk [11], which included not only techni-
cal factors but also human factors as well. Indicators such as “security
training and education” and “personnel security” were adopted to reduce
human errors or intended behaviours in an organisation.
On the other hand, the Center for Internet Security (CIS) metrics [4]
focus mostly on technical and business factors without consideration of
human factors. The CIS defined in [4] seven metrics that are directly
related to the overall incident management process, ranging from inci-
dent detection to incident recovery. We adopt two such technical metrics
defined in [4] as the basis for our work here.
Criticising past metrics as “labour intensive” and “subjective”, Lipp-
man et al. [7] argued that continuous risk assessment based on a data-
driven approach was necessary to reflect the constantly changing nature
of threats. The metrics proposed in [7] are of complex mathematical na-
ture and hence their applicability is questionable. Chew et al. [2] suggest
three types of metrics used differently depending on the purpose and
nature of a metric. Implementation metrics are intended to measure the
extent at which security policies are implemented. Secondly, effective-
ness/efficiency metrics measure how well security services are delivered.
Lastly, impact metrics aim to measure impacts of security incidents on
a business.
One could argue that the work presented here involves the second type
of metrics, since the aim of the work is to define metrics that measure
the readiness of an IT department within an organisation when facing
incidents over time. Measuring the readiness of security services allows for
the diagnoses of an organisation on its capability of handling unexpected
incidents.
Payne [8] suggested seven key steps to establishing a security metrics
programme. One of them is to establish benchmarks and targets. Setting
benchmarks is useful when evaluating success or failure of current secu-
rity controls [1]. There should be some criteria for benchmarks. Too sim-
plistic metrics may not be appropriate for being regarded as benchmarks
because they are naturally intuitive or self-explanatory. Thus, creating
an advanced metric based on basic ones is a good practice that we adopt
in our approach. Also, metrics for benchmarks need to be used for driv-
ing improvements for existing practices. It means that they have actual
impact on IT or business management.
In our case, we adopt a widely used large community dataset called
VERIS [13] as our benchmark on which we implement our new inci-
dent readiness metrics. After a benchmark is adopted in an organisation,
there is no hard and fast rule as to choosing a reference point for the
benchmark. The choice of acceptable levels for our metrics will depend
on organisational context.
3 Background
Literature has numerous metrics related to Cyber security (e.g. [4, 7, 11]).
We give here an overview of two such closely related metrics defined in
[4], which we use later as part of the definition of our new set of metrics.
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We also give an overview of a widely-used security incident vocabulary
and dataset known as VERIS, which we use as a benchmark reference
for the implementation of our new metrics.
3.1 Mean Time Between Security Incidents
The Mean Time between Security Incidents (MTBSI) metric is described
in [4] as a metric for calculating the mean time between occurrences of
security incidents in some organisation’s IT infrastructure. This type of
operational metrics can be defined by the following formula:
MTBSI = (
n−1∑
i=1
(Date of Occurence(incidenti+1)−
Date of Occurence(incidenti)))/(n− 1) (1)
Where n is the total number of recorded incidents. As a result, there
would be only n − 1 intervals between any n incidents. We consider
the unit of measurement of the MTBSI metric to be time, e.g. hours,
days, weeks etc. The following Table 1 shows an example of 10 incidents
recorded with the dates and times of their occurrences.
Incident number 1 2 3 4 5
Date of occurrence 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06
Time of occurrence 12:10 12:50 14:00 14:56 18:30
Incident number 6 7 8 9 10
Date of occurrence 01.06 02.06 02.06 02.06 02.06
Time of occurrence 18:35 07:20 09:20 12:30 19:40
Table 1. An Example of Incident Occurrence Dates and Times
To calculate the MTBSI for this example, we evaluate equation (1) above:
MTBSI = (40+70+56+214+5+765+120+190+430)
9
= 210 mins.
This means that, on average, there are 3.5 hours separating the occur-
rence of any two incidents.
3.2 Mean Time to Incident Recovery
The second widely-used metric for measuring Cyber security is the Mean
Time to Incident Recovery (MTIR), which reflects the mean time needed
from the moment an incident occurs to the moment it is recovered.
This type of operational metrics can be defined using the following for-
mula from [4]:
MTIR = (
n∑
i=1
(Date of Recovery(incidenti)−
Date of Occurence(incidenti)))/n (2)
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Where n is the total number of recorded incidents. We take the unit of
measurement for MTIR again to be time, e.g. hours, days, weeks etc.
Note that we divide over n since the number of recoveries is the same as
the number of incidents occurring. For example, in the following Table
2, we have again the same 10 incidents recorded from Table 1, but this
time also with their dates and times of recovery.
Incident number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Date of occurrence 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06
Time of occurrence 12:10 12:50 14:00 14:56 18:30 18:35
Date of recovery 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06
Time of recovery 13:55 14:40 19:30 19:05 20:10 21:30
Incident number 7 8 9 10
Date of occurrence 02.06 02.06 02.06 02.06
Time of occurrence 07:20 09:20 12:30 19:40
Date of recovery 02.06 02.06 02.06 03.06
Time of recovery 11:10 13:50 15:50 00:15
Table 2. An Example of Incident Occurrence/Recovery Dates and Times
To calculate MTIR for this example, we evaluate equation (2) above:
MTIR = (105+110+330+249+100+175+230+270+200+275)
10
= 204.4 mins.
This means that each incident takes on average about 3 hours and 24
minutes to recover.
3.3 VERIS
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) [13]
is a dataset and schema capturing a set of metrics for describing security
incidents. It is currently considered a leading provider of open quality
information in the IT security domain and provides a framework that or-
ganisations can use to collect and share information on security incidents
in a responsible and anonymous manner, with the aim of constructing a
ground on which researchers and experts in the IT security industry can
cooperate to learn from their experiences. We use the dataset provided
in VERIS, known as VCDB [14], as a benchmark on which we implement
our new blind spot-based metrics defined in the next sections.
The VERIS schema itself consists of five general sections, containing
descriptions of the security incidents in the VERIS dataset. These five
categories are as follows:
– Incident Tracking : this section contains general information about
the incidents, for example, the source identity, summary of the inci-
dent and whether the incident is related to other incidents.
– Victim demographies: this section contains information related to the
organisation being affected by the incident, for example, its country
of operation, number of employees, revenue and industry type.
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– Incident description: this section contains information related to the
question of “who did what to what (or whom) with what result”.
– Discovery and response: this section contains information related to
the incident’s timeline, its discovery method, root causes, corrective
actions etc.
– Impact assessment : this last section contains information on loss
categorisation and estimation, impact rating and so on.
For the purpose of this paper, we are mainly interested in one kind of
information; namely time to containment. This is the closest in nature
to the MTIR metric described above, and appears under the “Discovery
and response” section of information. In VCDB, this metadata appears
as timeline.containment. The available meaningful values for the time-
line unit for this metadata include seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks,
months, years and never. Other values are NA and unknown, but we do
not consider these to be useful.
The significance of the VERIS dataset lies in the fact that it is a community-
based dataset. This means that its data are collected from a wide range of
industries and varied over different types and sizes of organisations. This
renders it more interesting and with wider applicability than datasets
generated in single organisations.
4 The Mean Blind Spot Metric
Our new incident readiness metrics rely on a concept we call the Blind
Spot (BS). A BS is the time interval between the moment a new security
incident occurs and the last moment the previous security incident was
recovered, as shown in Figure 1. In its worse case, a BS represents the
Fig. 1. A Blind Spot
time when an organisation has to start recovery from a new incident
whilst still recovering from an earlier one. We consider this metric to
be an indication to the readiness of an organisation to encounter new
incidents and a measure of the vulnerability organisations may face in
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such situations where not enough resources are available to recover from
security incidents.
Note at this stage that, for the sake of simplicity, we do not consider
part of this model the scenario when two incidents arrive exactly at
the same moment in time (i.e. when Date of Occurence(incidenti) =
Date of Occurence(incidenti+1)). This is justified since later during the
VERIS-based implementation part, we replace this difference in arrival
time with the MTBSI metric (and again assume that MTBSI > 0).
We can average out this difference in occurrence times of new incidents
and the recovery times of older ones in terms of the Mean Blind Spot
(MBS) metric as follows:
MBS = (
n−1∑
i=1
(Date of Occurrence(incidenti+1)−
Date of Recovery(incidenti)))/(n− 1) (3)
The unit of measurement for the MBS metric is time, e.g. hours, days,
weeks etc. The mean is calculated over n − 1, as there are only n − 1
blind spots for n number of recorded incidents, as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. n− 1 Chain of Blind Spots
There are a couple of important assumptions this definition relies on:
– The definition assumes a first-come-first-serve model of scheduling
incidents to recovery resources, or in other words, incident i is sched-
uled for recovery before incident i+1. This is important for the blind
spot time area to be a true one, otherwise it will contain the idle time
that an incident spends waiting in the scheduling queue.
– The second assumption relies on the fact that all the recovery re-
sources will contribute positively to all the occurring security inci-
dents. In reality, this may not always be the case. Some resources
may require some time to become positive contributors to the re-
duction of the recovery time for an incident. In fact, some resources
may only have negative contribution to the recovery of an incident.
This situation is depicted in Figure 3, where we only assume Type
1 resources in our model.
Let’s consider how the MBS metric works through an example. The
following Table 3 shows again our 10 security incidents with their occur-
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Fig. 3. Resources Contribution to Incident Recovery
rence and recovery times, but this including also their blind spot times.
Incident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number
Occurrence Date 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 02.06 02.06 02.06 02.06
Occurrence Time 12:10 12:50 14:00 14:56 18:30 18:35 07:20 09:20 12:30 19:40
Recovery Date 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 01.06 02.06 02.06 02.06 03.06
Recovery Time 13:55 14:40 19:30 19:05 20:10 21:30 11:10 13:50 15:50 00:15
Blind Spot Interval -65 -40 -274 -35 -95 590 -110 -80 230 -
Table 3. An Example Showing Blind Spots
Note that for the last incident, there is no blind spot time as no inci-
dents are recorded after that. For this example, we can calculate MBS
as follows:
MBS = (((−65) + (−40) + (−274) + (−35) + (−95) + 590 + (−110)+
(−80) + 230))/9 = 13.44 mins.
A positive value (as in this case) for the MBS metric is good, since it
indicates that there is a positive time margin between, on average, the
occurrence and recovery of incidents. However, a negative value would
signal no such margin exists and that incidents’ recovery stages are over-
lapping. This may further have implications on an organisation’s capa-
bility to cope with the speed of occurrence of security incidents since
recovery from earlier incidents is, on average, slow.
We next discuss one variant of this metric, which incorporates an organ-
isation’s appetite for blind spots.
4.1 An Approximated MBS
A first variation of the MBS metric that we introduce is an approxi-
mated one, which can be calculated directly using the MTIR and MTBSI
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metrics discussed earlier. We call this variation the Approximate MBS
(AMBS) metric. The general formula for the AMBS metric is as follows:
AMBS =
MTIR
MTBSI
(4)
The intuition behind this metric is that it gives some sense of how large
the difference is between recovery and incident occurrence intervals as
captured by the MTIR and MTBSI metrics, respectively. Therefore, it
provides a quick way of understanding the effect of the blind spot prob-
lem. If, on average, recovery intervals are smaller than incident occur-
rence intervals, then this ratio would be less than one, which is good for
the organisation. If, on the other hand, the ratio is one or more, it means
that the occurrence intervals are at least as large as the recovery ones,
on average, which is bad for the organisation.
Consider again the example of the previous section. We calculated that
MTIR = 204.4 mins/interval and that MTBSI = 210. Therefore, one can
calculate AMBS = 204.4/210 = 0.973. This value, enforces the conclusion
arrived at by the calculation of the MBS metric that on average, in the
case of our example, blind spots do not pose a problem in terms of
overall time they last. As we see later in Section 5, this metric also gives
an indication as to the maximum number of incidents an organisation
may be recovering from in any one moment in time.
4.2 Ratio of Blind Spots Metric
The Ratio of Blind Spots (RBS) metric is not, strictly speaking, based on
the MBS metric but more fundamentally based on the concept of a blind
spot. In order to define RBS, we first define a Blind Spot Appetite (BSA)
value, which represents the maximum blind spot time an organisation or
an IT team is willing to tolerate. For example, a BSA value might be -60
minutes, meaning that the organisation is willing to tolerate scenarios
where recovery from an existing incident overlaps the occurrence of a
new one in a maximum of one hour.
The ratio BS/BSA therefore represents a measure of how far a blind
spot is from the appetite value. A value of BS/BSA = 1 or less means
that the blind spot is within the acceptable range and a value of more
than 1 means that the blind spot is unacceptable. For simplicity, we
approximate all the values of BS/BSA< 0 to 0, since in this case these
have the same meaning as to when BS/BSA=0. Returning to the example
of the previous section, we calculate the BS/BSA values for each blind
spot as shown in Table 4.
Incident Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Blind Spot Interval -65 -40 -274 -35 -95 590 -110 -80 230
BS/BSA Ratio 1.08 0.67 4.57 0.58 1.58 0 1.83 1.33 0
Table 4. Example Showing the ratio BS/BSA
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Based on the BS/BSA ratio, one can define the new RBS metric as
follows, in terms of the cardinality of a multiset (bag) of all those ratios
who’s value is over 1:
RBS =
card({|y where (y = BS/BSA) ∧ (y > 1)|})
n− 1 × 100% (5)
The RBS metric hence captures the percentage of the ratio of all the
BS/BSA elements, which are over 1, over the overall number of blind
spots. Unlike MBS, it does not rely on a mean-based calculation, but rep-
resents more the percentage of “risky” blind spots in an organisation or
an IT team. In our example, RBS = card({1.08, 4.57, 1.58, 1.83, 1.33})/9×
100% = 56%. This means that, despite the fact that MBS is on average
positive, 56% of blind spots are risky.
5 Method Implementation using VERIS
In this section, we propose a practical approach for implementing our
new metrics using the VERIS dataset (VCDB) [14]. This implementation
will allow organisations to obtain some idea of their level of readiness in
dealing with blind spots, without the need for much precise information
about their own security incidents.
5.1 Implementing the MBS Metric
Our first implementation provides a measurement function for new or-
ganisations to assess their level of readiness based on two pieces of in-
formation: First their MTBSI metric values and second the time to con-
tainment metric in the VERIS dataset. Note that here we parameterise
by MTBSI since VERIS, despite its rich collection of incident metadata,
does not specify whether two incidents belong to the same organisation
and in what temporal order they occur.
We define the signature of the blind spot readiness measurement func-
tion, f , as follows:
f : Time→ Percentage (6)
which takes in a time unit expressing the MTBSI for the particular or-
ganisation, and returns a percentage number expressing the level of blind
spot readiness for that organisation. This is the compliment of the per-
centage of incidents that are deemed to be risky with respect to the
information provided by the VERIS dataset, in the sense that there is
high likelihood that the organisation may not be prepared to contain
them in good time.
Our definition of f is constrained by two aspects of the VERIS dataset:
First, there are no timeline information across the reported incidents,
which means that it is not possible to conclude, given two incidents,
what their sequence is. Second, no concrete timeline data is given; only
time units (e.g. hours, days, weeks, etc.) As a result, our implementation
relies on the relationship between the lengths of the MTIR (i.e. time to
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containment) and MTBSI metrics when deciding whether a blind spot
exists or not.
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between a blind spot and the MTIR and
MTBSI metrics. In the absence of concrete dates/times marking the start
and recovery points of incidents, we consider MTBSI as the metric de-
scribing the uniform time difference between consecutive incident occur-
rences, and MTIR as the metric describing the uniform time between the
start and recovery times of incidents. As a result, an MTIR value that ex-
tends beyond MTBSI is in a blind spot area, and one that does not is not.
As a consequence of the lack of precise information on incident occurrence
Fig. 4. Relationship between a Blind Spot and MTIR, MTBSI
and recovery times in VERIS, one can only implement MBS as the differ-
ence between MTBSI and MTIR (i.e. implementation(MBS) = MTBSI−
MTIR). This is reasonable since the definition of a blind spot between
two incidents i and i+ 1 is such that Date of Occurrence(incidenti+1)−
Date of Recovery(incidenti). However, we can arrive at this by perform-
ing (Date of Occurrence(incidenti+1)−Date of Occurrence(incidenti))−
(Date of Recovery(incidenti) − Date of Occurrence(incidenti)), which is
the difference between MTBSI and MTIR, assuming a uniform value
for all incidents. Therefore, our implementation function f relies on this
difference, and can be defined in the following manner:
f(MTBSI) = (100%−
n∑
i=1
(percentage(ci))) where ci ≥ time unit(MTBSI)
where c represents the time unit (i.e. seconds, minutes, hours, days etc.)
for the Discovery-to-Containment stage in the timeline of events, and
hence percentage(c) is the percentage of all incidents where the time
to containment metric has been reported to be in that specific time
unit. On the other hand, n represents the number of time units that are
larger or equal to the MTBSI’s time unit, as returned by the auxiliary
function time unit. For example, if MTBSI = 15 hours/incident interval,
then time unit(MTBSI) = hours and n = 6, where the six time units
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in this case would be {hours, days, weeks,months, years, never}. We
enumerate these as c1, . . . , c6. Note here that we also include the hours
time unit, in order to err on the safe side. We also exclude those incidents
with a “NA” or “unknown” values. Finally, i ranges over n.
Considering the 2013Q4 version of the dataset, we have the following
percentages of incidents for each time unit of the time to containment
metric, as shown in Table 5.
Time Unit Seconds Minutes Hours Days Weeks Months Years Never
Percentage (%) 2.17 5.07 42.03 29.00 7.97 7.97 2.17 3.62
Table 5. Percentages of Incidents for Each Time Unit of the Time to Containment
Metric (VERIS, 2013 Quarter 4)
These numbers are based on a dataset size of 2476 incidents. Going back
to the example above of MTBSI = 15 hours/incident interval, one can
calculate f as follows:
f(15 hours/incident interval) = (100−∑6i=1(percentage(ci))%
where ci ≥ time unit(15 hours/incident interval)
= (100− (percentage(hours) + percentage(days)+
percentage(weeks) + percentage(months)+
percentage(years) + percentage(never)))%
= (100− (42.03 + 29 + 7.97 + 7.97 + 2.17 + 3.62))%
= 7.24%
This means that the organisation, according to its reported MTBSI value
of 15 hours/incident interval, will only be fully ready in 7.24% cases of
security incidents based on the data provided in the VERIS dataset. In
92.76% of cases, the organisation may/would struggle to cope with new
security incidents according to the blind spot readiness metric. On the
other hand, if for example the MTBSI was 15 weeks instead, then the
above value returned by f would rise to 78.27%.
5.2 Implementing the AMBS Metric
The second implementation we introduce will simply be an implementa-
tion of the AMBS metric. Recall that the AMBS metric is simply dividing
the length of the MTIR metric by the length of the MTBSI metric, as
depicted in Figure 5.
In addition to showing the ratio of the two metrics, it turns out that this
definition can be used to estimate the minimum and maximum number
of incidents that an organisation will have to deal with at any one time.
One can deduce this fact from considering that the start of every MTBSI
period signals the start of a new security incident. Therefore, if one was
to fix a time frame within which one could count the number of MTBSI
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Fig. 5. A Depiction of the Ratio of MTIR to MTBSI
periods, then this would also imply the number of incidents within that
time frame.
The latter case of the maximum number of incidents is particularly of
interest from an incident readiness point of view, as it provides the man-
agement team some idea of the scale of resources required to tackle such
events. The minimum number, on the other hand, will provide an indi-
cation of what level of resource relaxation the organisation can reach.
We start first by defining the following auxiliary function, faux2:
faux2(MTBSI, c) = {|dmin(c)/MTBSIe, dmax(c)/MTBSIe|}
which returns a multiset (bag) of two elements. These elements are the
minimum and maximum number of incidents the organisation will be
recovering from at any one time, corresponding to its specific value of
MTBSI and the time unit, c, of the time-to-containment metric (i.e. the
MTIR metric) as defined in VERIS. The MTBSI value is necessary here,
so this has to be supplied by the organisation. However, the time unit c
is ranged over all the meaningful time units defined in VERIS (i.e. days,
hours, weeks etc.).
We calculate these numbers as the ceiling (“the gallows”) ratio between
the minimum and maximum values we approximate for c as explained
below and the supplied value for MTBSI. This is needed since we consider
that a fraction of an incident is safer approximated to a whole incident
(i.e. next integer up).
We next explain how min(c) and max(c) are defined. Since c itself is only
a time unit due to the lack of concrete date/time information on VERIS-
recorded incidents, we require a 2-point time value concretisation of this
abstract time unit. We do this based on the following ranges (assuming
a month is 4.35 weeks):
range(seconds) = [1 second, 60 seconds)
range(minutes) = [1 minute, 60 minutes)
range(hours) = [1 hour, 24 hours)
range(days) = [1 day, 7 days)
range(weeks) = [1 week, 4.35 weeks)
range(months) = [1 month, 12 months)
range(years) = [1 year, ∞ years)
range(never) = [∞ years, ∞ years]
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Note that we do not consider the case of “never”, since this will result
in dividing ∞ by MTBSI, which returns an infinite number of incidents.
Since c effectively provides a time window within which the maximum
and minimum number of incidents are approximated, providing an infi-
nite time window will naturally lead to an infinite number of minimum
and maximum incidents. We do not consider this information meaningful
for understanding an organisation’s readiness in tackling those periods
of time when number of incidents is at its maximum.
Let’s consider now an example of how faux2 works. We assume that we
are calculating the function for the case of c = Weeks, then we need to
consider the following two points in time: At week 1 and at week 4.35.
This is because any less than 1 week the metric would turn to a daily time
unit and any more than 4.35 weeks the metric would turn into months.
If the organisation provides a value for MTBSI = 18 days = 2.57, then
this means that
faux2(18 Days,Weeks) = {|d1/2.57e, d4.35/2.57e|} = {|1, 2|}
On the other hand, if MTBSI was to drop to 1 day (i.e. 0.143 week),
then the number of incidents would increase:
faux2(1 Day,Weeks) = {|d1/0.143e, d4.35/0.143e|} = {|7, 31|}
Our function then for generating an AMBS estimation from the VERIS
dataset would pair each of these two values with the percentage of inci-
dents the c time unit occurs in VCDB:
f2(MTBSI, c) = (faux2(MTBSI, c), percentage(c)) (7)
Therefore, for the case of c = Weeks, we have that percentage(Weeks) =
7.97% from [13], and hence f2(18 Days,Weeks) = ({|1, 2|}, 7.97%) whilst
for the case of f2(1 Day,Weeks) = ({|7, 31|}, 7.97%). The meaning of
these pairs is to provide an approximate percentage (in this case 7.97%)
of the likelihood of the maximum/minimum incident number estimations
being true, with reference to the data provided in VCDB and the selected
c time unit. If the selected c time unit was changed, say to Days, the
pair would become (for the case of MTBSI = 18 days) ({|1, 1|}, 29%).
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented in this paper a new risk metric, called the blind spot,
for expressing Cyber incident recovery readiness in organisations and IT
departments. The new metric represents the gap in time between the re-
covery (or containment) of existing incidents and the occurrence of new
incidents. We postulate that the longer the gap, the more vulnerable the
organisation or IT department will be to lack of resources in tackling new
incidents, hence the relationship with the concept of incident response
readiness. Furthermore, we defined three variants of this new metric: the
Mean Blind Spot, the Approximated Mean Blind Spot and the Ratio
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of Blind Spots metrics. We demonstrated how these metrics can be im-
plemented over an open source large dataset containing information on
Cyber security incidents, namely the VERIS dataset.
The significance of the VERIS dataset lies in the fact that it is community-
driven, where data are collected from a variety of organisations in a wide
range of industries covering small, medium and large size organisations.
This ensures that the implementation of the new metrics is applicable
to the wider community. However, we plan in the future to further val-
idate the new metrics based on empirical data obtained from specific
case studies for IT teams and organisations. Such specific case studies
produce more accurate results, despite their scope of applicability. The
application of real empirical data to this metric may expose more (spe-
cific) benefits and drawbacks for the new metrics, possibly suggesting
ways to refine our initial conceptual model. Such studies will also help
incorporate new factors or new metadata into the current model, partic-
ularly since the characteristics of Cyber security incidents vary over time
also depending on the context. Therefore, the refinement of the metric
can yield more benefits for organisations.
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